In light of the foregoing, we conclude that hospital attorneys, risk managers, and other advocates despite the immense contribution which they may make to the process and deliberations of ethics committees—have a unique role in the bioethical decision-making process, but one that neither requires nor precludes membership on such committees. This is not to deny in any way appropriate access to committees or their deliberations by such advocates. Indeed, we would argue strongly that hospital attorneys and risk managers, where there (...) are reasons for including them in committee discussions, should be invited as consultants and participant-observers. Furthermore, we concur wit Gibson, who suggests that hospital attorneys have a teaching role which enhances the committee's understanding of relevant legal issues, cases, and decisions. this is especially true in individual case consultation. Ethics committees and institutional advocates both have important roles within health care institutions, but patients and hospitals are best served when these two agents collaborate without weakening or undermining their mutually distinct functions and priorities. This conclusion is based primarily on the widely acknowledged concern about conflict of interest as well as the more peripheral concern about loss of attorney/client privilege. However, we would argue that in all aspects of committee work, including self-education, policymaking and case review and consultation, these specialists in health law may often give expert advice and counsel to persons regarding a vast arrays of subjects. These include but are hardly limited to the following: Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, Living Will Legislation, Malpractice Law, Orders Not to Resuscitate, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment, Withholding Nutrition and Hydration, Treatment for Incompetent Patients, Proportionate vs. Disproportionate Treatment, and Suicide and the Law. HECs need to know how attorneys think and especially how hospital attorneys frame bioethical issues, just as they need to know how physicians and nurses think and respond. Even if hospital attorneys are not formally seated on HECs, they should participate in charting the currents in bioethics. Gibson feels that we need to re-examine the roles of the hospital attorney. Perhaps these advocates should be encouraged to wear more than just one “hat,” and for the rest of us to generalize about institutional advocates is both premature and prejudicial. When we stereotype attorneys with a generic label such as “institutional advocates,” we open ourselves to the dangers of an even narrower kind of “reflex advocacy” (11).To achieve open and honest dialogue, all voices and viewpoints must be heard. HECs that arbitrarily and totally exclude hospital attorneys from participation may exhibit the very close-mindedness they are seeking to eliminate. Yet this situation is at its core a paradoxical one: We cannot proscribe the advocate's role without constraining his or her effectiveness. Yet for the sake of their effectiveness we need to protect them from conflict-of-interest situations. Moreover, we also need to be certain that all points of view, including those that derive from the law, are given an adequate hearing by HECs. (shrink)

Respect is one of the central concepts in contemporary moral thought. It plays a prominent role in everyday, pre-philosophical moral thinking, as well as in recent moral theory and applied ethics. Yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect have received less attention than might be expected. This volume takes up some of these basic questions. The book is not meant to be a comprehensive handbook that covers all aspects of the topic of respect, nor is the focus (...) of the book mainly historical. Rather, the aim is to give leading experts in the field a chance to present their latest ideas and point the research on respect in new directions. Following an introductory historical essay, Part I addresses questions of what respect is, its nature and basis. Part II examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III deals with the practical application of requirements of respect. The essays in this volume will be of interest both to scholars and students working on issues of respect and to anyone interested in this central moral notion. (shrink)

This handbook presents a comprehensive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education combined with an up-to-date selection of the central themes. It includes 95 newly commissioned articles that focus on and advance key arguments; each essay incorporates essential background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic, examining the status quo of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discussing the possible futures of the field. The book provides a state-of-the-art overview of philosophy (...) of education, covering a range of topics: Voices from the present and the past deals with 36 major figures that philosophers of education rely on; Schools of thought addresses 14 stances including Eastern, Indigenous, and African philosophies of education as well as religiously inspired philosophies of education such as Jewish and Islamic; Revisiting enduring educational debates scrutinizes 25 issues heavily debated in the past and the present, for example care and justice, democracy, and the curriculum; New areas and developments addresses 17 emerging issues that have garnered considerable attention like neuroscience, videogames, and radicalization. The collection is relevant for lecturers teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of education as well as for colleagues in teacher training. Moreover, it helps junior researchers in philosophy of education to situate the problems they are addressing within the wider field of philosophy of education and offers a valuable update for experienced scholars dealing with issues in the sub-discipline. Combined with different conceptions of the purpose of philosophy, it discusses various aspects, using diverse perspectives to do so. Contributing Editors: Section 1: Voices from the Present and the Past: Nuraan Davids Section 2: Schools of Thought: Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe Section 3: Revisiting Enduring Debates: Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson Section 4: New Areas and Developments: Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma, and Claudia Ruitenberg. (shrink)

The publication of 'Animal Rights and Souls in the 18th Century' will be welcomed by everyone interested in the development of the modern animal liberation movement, as well as by those who simply want to savour the work of enlightenment thinkers pushing back the boundaries of both science and ethics. At last these long out-of-print texts are again available to be read and enjoyed - and what texts they are! Gems like Bougeant's witty reductio of the Christian view of animals (...) are included together with path-breaking works of ethics such as Primatt's A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals . There are works I have never seen before, including the remarkable Cry of Nature by the Scottish revolutionary Jacobin, John Oswald. In this set, everyone will find something novel, delightful and truly enlightening. - Peter Singer The discussion of animal rights and the moral status of animals, so prevalent in the late twentieth century, has its roots in the mid to late eighteenth century. Some of the themes we consider of recent invention - the legal standing of animals, the ethical status of vegetarians, cruelty towards animals, ultimately resulting in cruelty to humans - are of long standing. But in the eighteenth-century literature they are interconnected with theological issues surrounding animal souls, the birth of the life sciences, the great chain of being and other peculiarly eighteenth-century problems. This collection explores the exciting early discussions of moral theories concerning animals, placing them within their historical and social context. It reveals that issues such as vivisection, animal souls and vegetarianism were very much live philosophical subjects 200 years ago. The six volumes reprinted here includes complete works and edited extracts from such key eighteenth-century thinkers as Oswald, Primatt, Smellie, Monboddo and Jenyns. Many of the materials are extremely rare and never previously reprinted. The collection, edited with a new introduction and bio-bibliography by Aaron V. Garrett provides valuable original source material to supplement contemporary discussions of animal rights. --18th-century material on the theme of animal rights and practical ethics --an important supplement to contemporary animal rights discussions --provides a broader account of early discussions of the 'science of human nature' through animals --widens our understanding of 18th-century ethics through an important area of practical ethics --includes many scarce texts, most of which have never been reprinted before. (shrink)

The most well-known arguments for the simplicity of the soul - i.e., for the thesis that the subject of psychological states must be an unextended substance -are based upon the logical possibility of disembodiment. Descartes introduced this sort of argument into modern philosophy, and a version of it has been defended recently by Richard Swinburne. Some of the underlying assumptions of both arguments are examined and defended, but a closer look reveals that each depends upon unjustified inferences from the (...) conceivability of a certain state of affairs to the logical possibility of that state of affairs. (shrink)

The author discusses a puzzle about the place of intention in art, a puzzle first articulated by Richard Wollheim in his well‐known lecture ‘On Drawing an Object’. The puzzle arises if we try to hold jointly three commonly‐held claims, viz. Art is intentional; The artist, in making a work of art, needs to observe what he has done, in order to know what he has done; A necessary condition of intentional action is that when an agent acts intentionally then (...) he knows what he is doing without observation, or any need for it. Prima facie it would appear that we cannot hold all these claims together.The author spells out the problem, discusses Wollheim’s own solution to it and seeks to dispel the puzzle by closer attention to intention and action in relation to artistic production. (shrink)

The author discusses a puzzle about the place of intention in art, a puzzle first articulated by Richard Wollheim in his well‐known lecture ‘On Drawing an Object’. The puzzle arises if we try to hold jointly three commonly‐held claims, viz. (1) Art is intentional; (2) The artist, in making a work of art, needs to observe what he has done, in order to know what he has done; (3) A necessary condition of intentional action is that when an agent (...) acts intentionally then he knows what he is (intentionally) doing without observation, or any need for it. Prima facie it would appear that we cannot hold all these claims together.The author spells out the problem, discusses Wollheim’s own solution to it (which he rejects) and seeks to dispel the puzzle by closer attention to intention and action in relation to artistic production. (shrink)

Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully (...) determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe - if neuroscience does not rule this out - there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Godel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. Papers by Patrick Haggard, Tim Bayne, Harald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter, Solomon Feferman, and John Lucas investigate these issues. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). The papers of Frank Jackson, Richard Swinburne, and Howard Robinson investigate these issues. The remaining papers, of Galen Strawson, Helen Steward, and R.A. Duff, consider what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or to be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events, or what? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Intersection of Heidegger's Philosophy and His Politics as Reflected in the Views of His Contemporaries at the University of FreiburgRichard DetschThere has been so much speculation in the last ten years or more about the reasons for and the extent of Heidegger's involvement in the Nazi movement that another attempt to come to grips with this important problem might seem superfluous. Amidst the weighty arguments advanced in what (...) has become a multitude of treatises and tomes, however, there has thus far been little interest in dealing with Heidegger's simple statement in his Spiegel interview that he was moved by the "confusion of opinions... from 22 parties... to adopt a political stance that was national and above all social."1 If we suspend our suspicion for the moment that Heidegger is here again manipulating the facts to fit his postwar predicament, as has been amply demonstrated [End Page 407] regarding other details, and examine the evidence we will find that there are indeed indications of the predominance of Heidegger's social concerns with respect to the political situation of the early '30s as well as of his leaning toward an authoritarian form of government an inclination shared, to be sure, by a significantly large number of his compatriots, academic and otherwise. There is one approach in particular toward answering the question of why Heidegger became a Nazi which the present attempt hopes to put in question: the emphasis on his abandonment of his Christian religious origins. The following statement by Theodore Kisiel expresses this line of reasoning most succinctly: "It will take a decade, but it will be not just an anti-Catholic, nor an anti-Christian, but the full-blown anti-religious attitude of the German Geist ripened from German Idealism that sweeps Heidegger into National Socialism, with all the romantic fervor of another religious conversion."2 John Caputo argues, based on the work of Kisiel and van Buren, that the Heidegger of the early twenties was drawing from two "equiprimordial" sources, "the Aristotelian and the Christian." "It was only in the 1930's, in the period of Heidegger's active political engagement with National Socialism, that the twofold root of the tradition was pruned to a single root... a Great Greek beginning from which everything Jewish and Christian, everything Roman, Latin, and Romance, was to be excluded as fallen, derivative, distortive, and inauthentic."3 This shift in perspective, this rejection by Heidegger of earlier Christian impulses in his work led to "fatal" lapses in the ethical realm: "... by leaving behind Kierkegaard and Luther... and by treating Aristotle as a fading echo of the primordially early Greek, Heidegger left the question of Being in a state of utter mystification about ethico-political matters, about the matter of our concrete responsibilities to one another."4 David Farrell Krell makes this lack of respect for and attention to the "other" the centerpiece of an entire study attempting to show Heidegger's propensity for the inhuman ideology of Nazism.5 These arguments derive perhaps from the rhetorical question posed by the Freiburg historian Hugo Ott in 1988: "Didn't this pseudo-religious expectation of salvation [through the mission of the Führer] conceal a monstrous hubris, wasn't the thinking of Heidegger in its radically contained, i.e., in its elementary [End Page 408] simplicity really a surrogate for the Christian view of life thrown overboard?"6 The problem with all such arguments is that "the Christian view of life" did not prevent others of a background similar to Heidegger's from an enthusiastic acceptance of Nazism without an abandonment of their religious faith. In this regard, let the case of Engelbert Krebs, Heidegger's one-time friend and mentor, the Jesuit priest who officiated at his marriage ceremony, serve as an example. Ott deals with Krebs fairly extensively in his Heidegger biography, stressing Krebs's chagrin when Heidegger turned his back on the Catholic Church, but fails to mention at all the enthusiasm for the Nazi movement that Krebs shared with his former friend.During his tenure as dean of the Theological Faculty at the University of Freiburg, Krebs delivered an address in a university lecture... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EDWARD W. STRONG, 1901--1990 Edward W. Strong, one.of the founders and leaders of the Journal of the HistoryofPhilosophy,passed away on January 13, 199o, after a long struggle with cancer. Born in Dallas, Oregon in 19~ 1, he was eighty-eight years old when he died. He did his undergraduate studies at Stanford, receiving his B.A. in 1925. Then he went on to graduate studies at Columbia, where he received a (...) master's degree in 1927 and a Ph.D. in 1937. He taught at City College in New York from 1927 to 1932, and then began his long career at the University of California, Berkeley, where he remained for the rest of his academic life. During World War II, he became laboratory manager of the university's Radiation Laboratory (now called the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory), which was part of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. After the war, Strong became a full professor in 1947, chairman of the Sociology Department from 1946 to 1952, Associate Dean of the College of Letters and Sciences from 1947 to 1955, a leader of the Academic Senate and its Educational Policy Committee, and Chancellor of the Berkeley campus from 1961 to 1965.This was a period of very rapid growth for the campus as well as its most troubled time. When the student rebellion--the Free Speech Movement--broke out, Strong tried valiantly but unsuccessfully to preserve those academic values he felt most challenged. As the conflict wore on, he ceased to have the full support of his superiors, the President of the Universityand the Board of Regents, who negotiated a resolution with the students, the effects of which are still being felt at Berkeley and elsewhere in the United States. Some feel that Strong's position in the struggle that transformed American universities has not been properly understood, and that his role has been portrayed unfairly to enhance that of his superiors. In any event, he resigned as Chancellor and became Professor Emeritus in 1967. Strong developed his interest in the history of philosophy, history of science, and history of ideas at Columbia during its heyday as a center for such concerns, under the leadership of John Dewey and Frederick Woodbridge. He told me that he was also very much influenced by the historical interests of Morris Raphael Cohen, his senior colleague at City College. His dissertation, Proceduresand Methods,was, and still is, a basic study of the origin and development of modern science. (It was mentioned approvingly in an article by Ernst [9] 10 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:1 JANUARY 1991 Cassirer, in 194o). In contrast to E. A. Burtt, whose MetaphysicalFoundationsof ModernPhysicalSciencestressed the philosophical and theological concerns of the early scientists, Strong emphasized the practical engineering concerns that were involved at the time. This led him to studies of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, as well as to the scientific views of medieval thinkers, and modern views in the philosophy of science. Philosophically he was a naturalist, continuing the Columbia tradition. He was also very interested in Bergson's views, especially as they related to modern scientific ideas. He was the inspirer and founder of the History of Science discussion group at Berkeley, which became an important forum for creative research in this area. Strong was President of the American Philosophical Association in 1959. Because of the limited attention and concern given to the history of philosophy in most of the then-existing philosophicaljournals in America, the American Philosophical Association in 1957 approved in principle the establishment of a journal devoted to the history of philosophy, and appointed a committee of six members--Paul Kristeller, Gregory Vlastos, Richard McKeon, Julius Weinberg, John Goheen, and Edward Strong--to explore "ways and means to this end." Since all American philosophical journals at that time were published in the East and Midwest, Strong and Goheen were encouraged to try to establish the journal in the West. Strong has detailed the efforts to do this in his article, "The Founding of theJournal oftheHistoryofPhilosophy,"Journalof theHistoryofPhilosophy~5 (1987): 179-83. I first met Ed Strong at Trinity College, Dublin, in the summer of 1953, when I was a... (shrink)

For centuries philosophers have argued about the existence and nature of God. Do we need God to explain the origins of the universe? Can there be morality without a divine source of goodness? How can God exist when there is so much evil and suffering in the world? All these questions and many more are brought to life with clarity and style in The God of Philosophy. The arguments for and against God's existence are weighed up, along with discussion of (...) the meaning of religious language, the concept of God and the possibility of life after death. This new edition brings the debate right up to date by exploring the philosophical arguments of the new atheists such as Richard Dawkins, as well as considering what the latest discoveries in science can tell us about why many believe in the existence of the divine. (shrink)

For centuries philosophers have argued about the existence and nature of God. Do we need God to explain the origins of the universe? Can there be morality without a divine source of goodness? How can God exist when there is so much evil and suffering in the world? All these questions and many more are brought to life with clarity and style in The God of Philosophy. The arguments for and against God's existence are weighed up, along with discussion of (...) the meaning of religious language, the concept of God and the possibility of life after death. This new edition brings the debate right up to date by exploring the philosophical arguments of the new atheists such as Richard Dawkins, as well as considering what the latest discoveries in science can tell us about why many believe in the existence of the divine. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.1 (2000) 106-123 [Access article in PDF] The (Mis)Uses of Cannibalism in Contemporary Cultural Critique C. Richard King At least since 1979, when W. Arens demystified what he termed "the man-eating myth," cannibalism, once a fundamental feature of the anthropological imagination and a primary trope for interpreting cultural difference, has become subject to serious debate and lingering doubt [see Osborne]. Even as some anthropologists have sought to (...) recuperate anthropophagy as a tangible symbolic, ideological, and ritual complex [Brown and Tuzin; Conklin, "'Thus are our Bodies'"; Forsyth; Harris, Good to Eat 199-234; Sanday], a constellation of scholarly projects and popular works has complicated cannibalism by relocating it in the West. Perhaps most visibly, Hollywood cinema has reclaimed cannibalism. Although a handful of films have revived well-worn clichés of dark-skinned savages preparing to consume Westerners, as in King Solomon's Mines and Crocodile Dundee, others have cast the Western subject as cannibal to grapple with the horrors of reluctant cannibalism, as in Alive! [see Fiddes 121-31], to work through the transgressive and terrifying desires associated with psychopathic cannibalism, as in The Silence of the Lambs [Fuss; Halberstam], and importantly to parody the normative beliefs and behaviors of white, middle-class, heterosexual EuroAmericans, as in Eating Raoul and Parents. At the same time, an array of scholars, artists, and activists have invoked cannibalism to fashion critical perspectives on Western cultural practices. In his film Cannibal Tours (1987), Dennis O'Rourke encourages his audiences to think critically about tourists who travel to the Sepik River Valley to encounter reformed cannibals, asking implicitly who the cannibals are, the Melanesians who formerly (were thought to/claim to have) practiced anthropophagy or the tourists who travel to New Guinea to consume them [see Bruner]. Others have pushed the metaphor. Michael Ames, borrowing explicitly from O'Rourke, uses the cannibal to reframe ethnographic museums and their practices. Similarly, Jane Tompkins asserts that "Museums are a form of cannibalism made safe for polite society" [533]. More generally, Crystal Bartolovich playfully glosses consumerism as the cultural logic of the late cannibalism; bell hooks speaks of the EuroAmerican desires for and incorporation of things ethnic as "eating the other"; and Rosalind Morris suggests that cannibalism is the essential metaphor for late capitalism. More telling, however, are a set of overlapping critical projects that offer detailed theorizations [End Page 106] [Begin Page 108] of contemporary anthropophagy. Here, I will examine three that have had an important impact on discussions of tourism, museums, cultural appropriation, and consumption. Dean MacCannell, in an exciting exploratory review of the documentary Cannibal Tours, makes explicit what O'Rourke left unsaid: we are cannibals, and contemporary capitalism is neocannibalism. Perhaps more radically, Jack Forbes argues that Western civilization fosters cannibalism as an embodied, psychosocial condition or psychosis rooted in exploitation and consumption. Inspired at least in part by Forbes, Deborah Root rethinks Western civilization as cannibal culture.Although I am terribly sympathetic with these perspectives, particularly their political commitments and theoretical creativity, I am disturbed by the practices and effects that animate them. Indeed, as powerful as this critical field promises to be, it is at the same time troubling and dangerous. Although it defamiliarizes practices of cultural production and consumption, it does not enhance understanding of the contexts in which individuals and institutions deploy them and does less to effectively challenge or undermine them. In reframing beliefs and behaviors to accentuate productivity and power, it reinstates and reaffirms binaries and, worse, often turns on the same forms of appropriation.* * *Arguably, flesh eating has always promoted the elaborations of differences. Works central to the Western canon mobilize cannibalism to make (sense of) the world. Herodotus offers an early anthropophagic distinction:These Scythian husbandmen then occupy the country eastward for three days' journey.... Beyond this region the country is desert for a great distance; and beyond the desert Androphagi dwell.... The Androphagi have the most savage customs of all men; they pay no regard to justice, nor make use of any established law. They are nomads and wear a dress like a Scythian; they... (shrink)

The humanity formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant's moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant's ethics have recently turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant's ethics. Nevertheless, it has received less attention than many other (...) aspects of Kant's ethics. Richard Dean offers the most sustained and systematic examination of the humanity formulation to date. He presents an original analysis of what it means to treat humanity as an end in itself, and examines the implications both for Kant scholarship and for practical guidance on specific moral issues. (shrink)

Has moral relativism run its course? The threat of 9/11, terrorism, reproductive technology, and globalization has forced us to ask anew whether there are universal moral truths upon which to base ethical and political judgments. In this timely edited collection, distinguished scholars present and test the best answers to this question. These insightful responses temper the strong antithesis between universalism and relativism and retain sensitivity to how language and history shape the context of our moral decisions. This important and relevant (...) work of contemporary political and social thought is ideal for use in the classroom across many disciplines, including political science, philosophy, ethics, law, and theology. (shrink)

Joshua Greene has argued that several lines of empirical research, including his own fMRI studies of brain activity during moral decision-making, comprise strong evidence against the legitimacy of deontology as a moral theory. This is because, Greene maintains, the empirical studies establish that “characteristically deontological” moral thinking is driven by prepotent emotional reactions which are not a sound basis for morality in the contemporary world, while “characteristically consequentialist” thinking is a more reliable moral guide because it is characterized by greater (...) cognitive command and control. In this essay, I argue that Greene does not succeed in drawing a strong statistical or causal connection between prepotent emotional reactions and deontological theory, and so does not undermine the legitimacy of deontological moral theories. The results that Greene relies on from neuroscience and social psychology do not establish his conclusion that consequentialism is superior to deontology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Should We Treat as an End in Itself? Value and Ends The Argument for the Humanity Formulation How Particular Duties Follow Final Thoughts Bibliography.

Kant emphasizes that moral philosophy must be divided into two parts, a metaphysics of morals, and an empirical application to individuals, which Kant calls 'moral anthropology'. But Kant gives humanity (die Menschheit) a prominent role even in the purely rational part of ethics – for example, one formulation of the categorical imperative is a demand to treat humanity as an end in itself. This paper argues that the only concepts of humanity suited to play such a role are the rational (...) idea of humanity, and the rational ideal derived from this idea, which Kant discusses in Critique of Practical Reason and other texts. (shrink)

Do sensory measurements deserve the label of “measurement”? We argue that they do. They fit with an epistemological view of measurement held in current philosophy of science, and they face the same kinds of epistemological challenges as physical measurements do: the problem of coordination and the problem of standardization. These problems are addressed through the process of “epistemic iteration,” for all measurements. We also argue for distinguishing the problem of standardization from the problem of coordination. To exemplify our claims, we (...) draw on olfactory performance tests, especially studies linking olfactory decline to neurodegenerative disorders. (shrink)

One formulation of the Categorical Imperative tells us to treat humanity as an end in itself. It has become common to think that ‘humanity’ (die Menschheit) here refers to some minimal power of rationality that is necessarily possessed by any rational agent, but I argue that this common reading is misguided. Instead, ‘humanity’ refers to a good will, the will of a being who is committed to moral principles. This good will reading of ‘humanity’ is not only suggested by passages (...) in which Kant specifically discusses humanity, but also is more consistent with the main ideas of Kant's ethics. (shrink)

The claim that everyone ought to be treated with respect is a familiar and widely accepted prescription in recent moral philosophy, often expressed as a principle of ‘respect for persons.’ I argue that this principle need not be justified by a claim that every person possesses some feature – dignity, autonomy, value, or the like – that makes her worthy of respect. There is abundant conceptual space within many approaches to moral philosophy, including a Kantian approach, to affirm a duty (...) of respect for all persons, while denying that the duty is justified by the respect-worthiness of every person. (shrink)

There seems to be something wrong with passing moralistic judgments on others’ moral character. Immanuel Kant’s ethics provides insight into an underexplored way in which moralistic judgments are problematic, namely, that they are both a sign of fundamentally poor character in the moralistic person herself and an obstacle to that person’s own moral self-improvement. Kant’s positions on these issues provide a basically compelling argument against moralistic judgment of others, an argument that can be detached from the most controversial elements of (...) Kantian ethics to stand as plausible and instructive in its own right. (shrink)

An overwhelming majority of business travelers are now members of frequent flier programs operated by the airline industry. This article addresses relevant ethical issues, particularly employee perceptions of ethical issues, in such programs. A structured questionnaire technique, supported by personal interviews, was used to gather insights into frequent flier practices and attitudes. A fundamental conclusion of the research is that (1) significant ethical dilemmas are posed by frequent flier programs, (2) employees and employers generally choose to ignore these ethical dilemmas, (...) and (3) employee perception of the ethical issues in frequent flier programs is not significantly influenced by employee attributes such as education level, salary, organizational position, age or sex. Recommendations are offered to reduce the inherent ethical dilemmas in frequent flier programs. (shrink)

Girotto and Legrenzi's 1993 facilitation effect for their SARS version of Wason s THOG problem a disjunctive reasoning task was examined. The effect was not replicated when the standard THOG problem instructions were used in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3 when Girotto and Legrenzi's precise instructions were used, facilitation was observed. Experiment 4 further investigated the role of the type of instructions in the observed facilitation. The results suggest that such facilitation may result from attentional factors rather (...) than the use of a combinatorial analysis in the problem. (shrink)

In higher eukaryotes, ‘replication factories’ coordinate DNA synthesis within local clusters of chromatin domains. Recent experiments(1,2) have confirmed the complexity of these clusters and established that the organization of sites labelled during S phase persists throughout the cell cycle. This implies that domain clusters are critical elements of an hierarchy that is fundamental to both nuclear and chromosome structure.

It may be that eukaryotic nuclei contain a collection of operationally independent units (genes), each controlled through its interactions with soluble protein factors which diffuse at random throughout the nucleoplasmic space. Alternatively, nuclei might be organized in such a sophisticated fashion that specific genes, occupy distinct sites and that spatially ordered RNA synthesis, processing and transport delivers mature RNAs to predestined sites in the cytoplasm.Different fields of research support each of these extreme views. Molecular biologists inspecting the precise details of (...) specific interactions, usually in vitro, inevitably favour the former, while cell biologists working with far more complicated systems generally assume that more elaborate arrangements exist. In considering the importance of nuclear architecture, I have attempted to relate a collection of experiments each of which intimates some close relationship between structural aspects of chromatin organization and the precise mechanisms underlying nuclear function. I will argue that higherorder structures are crucial for achieving the observed efficiency and coordination of many nuclear processes. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: Epistemology Part II: Metaphysics.

Volume 97, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 419-419.

In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kant's moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskey's argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that (...) a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own account, his argument does not establish that Kant's ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism. (shrink)

Suspicion of “physics envy” surrounds the standard statistical toolbox used in the empirical sciences, from biology to psychology. Mainstream methods in these fields, various lines of criticism point out, often fall short of the basic requirements of measurement. Quantitative scales are applied to variables that can hardly be treated as measurable magnitudes, like preferences or happiness; hypotheses are tested by comparing data with conventional significance thresholds that hardly mention effect sizes. This article discusses what I call “shmeasurement.” To “shmeasure” is (...) to fail to apply quantitative tools to quantitative questions. We “shmeasure” when we try to measure what cannot be measured, or, conversely, when we ask binary questions of continuous measurements. Following the critics of standard statistical tools, it is argued that our statistical toolbox is indeed less concerned with the measurement of magnitudes than we take it to be. This article adds, however, that measurement is not all there is to scientific activity. Most techniques of proof do not resemble measurement as much as voting—a practice that makes frequent use of numbers, figures, or measurements, yet is not chiefly concerned with assessing quantities. Measurement is only one among three functions of the scientific toolbox, the other two being collating observations and deciding which hypotheses to relinquish. I thus make a plea for “shmeasurement”: the mismeasure of things starts to make more sense once we take into account the nonquantitative side of scientific practice. (shrink)

Without doubt, good numbers that characterize sharply and completely the phenomena being studied, and precise explanation of these phenomena that can be expressed mathematically, are tremendous advantages for a field of science. But not all fields of science are lucky enough to be able to achieve these features. And when they are not, nonetheless to force the phenomena studied to be characterized largely with numbers and the causal mechanisms to be described mathematically can court seriously limiting and distorting the field (...) of study. Research by economists on long-run economic development is an example of a field of research where this has happened. But unfortunately the phenomena are widespread throughout science. (shrink)

Any discipline of human knowledge is characterized by three fundamental elements: the complexity of its content, the method used for its elaboration, and the language used for its expression. This article argues that any method for making knowledge is a particular combination of three main components that we can call science, art, and revelation. The right combination depends on the complexity of the slice of reality that we wish to understand in each case. Is there a relationship between the quantity (...) and quality of a particular piece of knowledge and the quantity and quality of its eventual audience? Such a relationship serves, I believe, to avoid certain old misunderstandings. (shrink)

Biological sciences have strived to adopt the conceptual framework of physics and have become increasingly quantitatively oriented, aiming to refute the assertion that biology appears unquantifiable, unpredictable, and messy. But despite all effort, biology is characterized by a paucity of quantitative statements with universal applications. Nonetheless, many biological disciplines—most notably molecular biology—have experienced an ascendancy over the last 50 years. The underlying core concepts and ideas permeate and inform many neighboring disciplines. This surprising success is probably not so much attributable (...) to mathematical and statistical approaches in molecular biology, but rather to the preponderance of qualitative approaches, especially visualization. Visualizations can be afforded by quantitative research, but usually they rely on both, quantitative and qualitative research. I claim the following three features to be responsible for the unceasing zeal for using visualizations: visual representations facilitate reasoning, images can be cognitively processed in a “fast” manner, and abstractions of visual representations prompt conceptual advances. In summary, visualizations have largely contributed to the success of molecular biology by conveying its concepts to other disciplines, and at the same time, eclipsing mere quantitative approaches. However, visualizations also bear the risk of misinterpretation when traversing neighboring disciplines and even more so when pervading nonscientific domains. (shrink)

In “Kant’s Conception of Humanity,” Joshua Glasgow defends a traditional reading of the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Specifically, he opposes taking good will to be the end in itself, and instead argues that the end in itself must be some more minimal “rational capacity.” Most of Glasgow’s article is directed against some arguments I have given in favor of taking the end in itself to be a good will, or the will of a rational being who is committed (...) to morality. In this response to Glasgow, I both consider Glasgow’s main points, and propose some general strategies for avoiding common interpretive pitfalls in discussing the humanity formulation. (shrink)

Debating Terrorism is an innovative new textbook, addressing a number of key issues in contemporary terrorism studies from both 'traditional' and 'critical' perspectives. In recent years, the terrorism studies field has grown in quantity and quality, with a growing number of scholars rooted in various professional disciplines beginning to debate the complex dynamics underlying this category of violence. Within the broader field, there are a number of identifiable controversies and questions which divide scholarly opinion and generate opposing arguments. These relate (...) to theoretical issues, such as the definition of terrorism and state terrorism, substantive issues like the threat posed by al Qaeda and the utility of different responses to terrorism, different pathways leading people to engage in terrorist tactics, and ethical issues such as the torture of terrorist suspects and targeted assassination. This volume aims to bring together in one place many of the field's leading scholars to debate the key issues relating a set of 12 important controversies and questions. The format of the volume involves a leading scholar taking a particular position on the controversy, followed by an opposing or alternative viewpoint written by another scholar. In addition to the pedagogic value of allowing students to read opposing arguments in one place, the volume will also be important for providing an overview of the state of the field and its key lines of debate. This textbook will be essential reading for all students of terrorism and political violence, critical terrorism studies, critical security studies, security studies and IR in general. (shrink)

The stigmatization of some groups of people, whether for some characteristic they possess or some behavior they engage in, will initially strike most of us as wrong. For many years, academic work in public health, which focused mainly on the stigmatization of HIV-positive individuals, reinforced this natural reaction to stigmatization, by pointing out the negative health effects of stigmatization. But more recently, the apparent success of anti-smoking campaigns which employ stigmatization of smokers has raised questions about whether stigmatization may sometimes (...) be justified, because of its positive effects on public health. Discussion of the issue so far has focused on consequences, and on some Kantian considerations regarding the status of the stigmatized. In this article, I argue that further Kantian considerations regarding the treatment of the general public (the potential stigmatizers) also count against any public health policy involving stigmatization. Attempts to encourage stigmatization are likely to fail to appeal to the rational decision-making abilities of the general public, and the creation of stigmatized groups (even if they are stigmatized for their voluntary behavior) is an obstacle to the self-improvement of members of the general public. (shrink)